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Notes ENTERPRISEJOINT ADVENTUREStratton:
OR JOINT
TWO THEORIES OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In the recent case of Sumner v. Amacher the Montana Supreme
Court questioned the application of the joint venture 2 doctrine as it
imputed contributory negligence of the driver of an automobile to the
passenger.3 The court decided that as a matter of law, no joint adventure4 existed because in that case no common pecuniary interest was
involved nor did the evidence establish a common right of control.5
The facts of the case are that the defendent, Amacher, an employee
of the co-defendent Wellington D. Rankin, 6 was driving a vehicle owned
by Rankin and was within his scope of authority. At the time of the
accident the plaintiff, Floyd Sumner, was riding with his wife Belinda,
who was driving. They were traveling to Great Falls, Montana, for a
dual purpose: he was to attend a business meeting and his wife was
going with him to visit friends there. The car was jointly owned by
the Sumners, but driven almost exclusively by Belinda Sumner. They
intended to share the driving during the trip.
The court held that Amacher's unsafe and illegal left turn across
the traffic lane was a proximate cause of the accident, but that Belinda
Sumner was contributorily negligent for passing the defendant's vehicle within a yellow-lined no passing zone. The jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff against both defendants in the sum of $37,000, and
after judgment was entered each defendant separately filed a motion
for a new trial and a motion to set aside the verdict and the judgment.
All motions denied, both defendants appealed. The second issue, on
appeal, involved whether Belinda Sumner's contributory negligence

I-------Mont ..........

, 437 P.2d 630 (1968).
The doctrine of joint venture is also referred to by courts and writers as joint
adventure or joint enterprise. The terms are generally applied interchangeably,
however, for the purpose of clarity the terms as used in this article will have these
precise meanings: A joint adventure is defined by the following essential
elements:
(1)
an agreement, express or implied, among the members of
the group; (2) a common purpose to be carried out by the group; (3) a community
of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the members; and (4) and equal right
to a voice in the direction of the enterprise, which gives an equal right of control.
The distinctive element in a joint adventure is the seeking of profits associated with
a correlative obligation to share the losses. A joint enterprise if defined by the
same four elements except pecuniary interest is not required among the members,
only that there be a community of interest for the mutual benefit or pleasure of
the members. See Shook v. Beals, 96 Cal. App.2d 963- ......... , 217 P.2d 56, 61, 18
A.L.R.2d 919, 924 (1950); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491, Comment C
(1965); 48 C.J.S. Joint Adventure § 1 (1947).
'Passenger is used in the generic sence of a rider or guest in the same vehicle and
does not express the technical meaing set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 490, Comment a (1965).
'The Court does not distinquish between joint enterprise and joint adventure but
applies the term joint venture to both concepts. See note 2, supra.
r437 P.2d at 635.
'Wellington D. Rankin died prior to commencement of 'litigation and his Executrix,
Louise R. Rankin was substituted as defendant.
2
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should be imputed to her husband to bar his recovery on the ground
that the Sumners were involved in a joint venture.7
In affirming the lower court's judgment, the Supreme Court said
that in Montana a community of pecuniary interest is an indispensable
element of the doctrine of joint adventure. 8 The court further rejected
expressly a concept of joint enterprise established by the evidence
of a common purpose and a mere community of interest, but involving
no business interest. 9 The court noted that the concept of joint adventure
in the usual sense is strictly a commercial or business venture for the
mutual financial gain of the members.' 0
The court's rejection of the joint enterprise doctrine in favor of the
joint adventure doctrine under circumstances of imputing contributory
negligence presents three fundamental questions:
(1)

Whether the theory of joint enterprise should have been rejected;

(2) Whether rejection of joint enterprise theory, as it is applied to
contributory negligence, should also be rejected when applied to imputing negligence to several enterprisers jointly; and (3) Whether the
acceptance of the doctrine of joint adventure promotes the principles
of social benefit which underly the concepts of vicarious liability.
VICARIOUS LIABILITYTHE DOCTRINE OF "SOCIAL INSURANCE"
In making an evaluation of the effects of a joint adventure or joint
enterprise on the innocent party, it is necessary to discuss the policy
roots supporting the doctrine of vicarious liability. The policy of holding an innocent defendant vicariously liable for the torts of another
person has not always been part of the law. Historically, if A is injured
because of B's wrongful conduct, under traditional tort principles the
loss which occurred is shifted from A to B. However, society acquired
no benefit from merely shifting the burden of loss to the tort-feasor.
The good derived by compensating the plaintiff is wholly offset by
the harm caused when taking that amount from the defendant. Shifting
the loss from one party to the other is based on concepts of fairness or
a desire to discourage harmful conduct or a combination of both. The
resulting standard is no liability without fault."
With the advent of the machine age, a transition in traditional
tort doctrine occurred. During this industrialization period an increas-

7437 P.2d at 634. In this instance the Court applies the term joint venture to the
concept of joint enterprise and not to a joint adventure situation.
8

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 491(1) (1965).

0437 P.2d at 635.
LId. at 635.
"James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE

L. REV. 549 (1948) [Hereinafter cited
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol30/iss1/7
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ing number of injuries fell upon employees and third persons who,
as a class, could least sustain the burden of loss. Because of a distinct
social benefit accruing from compensating victims of these accidents,
new doctrines developed within the framework of the law, but without
changing the substantive body of the law. 12 What eventually emerged
was a doctrine of deliberate allocation of risk,13 which endeavored to
assure compensation to injured parties by shifting the liability for the
loss to the employer whenever possible. Such losses to him, considered
as a cost of doing business, would be reflected in prices and the burden
ultimately shifted foreward to the consuming public. The process is
called "social insurance" and is the theoretical foundation for shifting
liability from the negligent party onto the innocent but financially
responsible employer.
Necessary to this theory of vicarious liability is the agency concept
of Respondeat Superior. Because of the agency relationship between
A and B, B's tortious conduct is imputed to A, even though A is not neglinor has he participated in or ratified B's actions. In one sense, this is a
doctrine of strict liability applied to A when he is held vicariously liable
to a third party for B's conduct. In another sense, the theory is an
extension of fault liability to an additional, albeit innocent, party.
Liability is still determined by negligence of some one and the usual
4
rules of torts are applicable to it.' One important consideration in imputing B's negligence to A is the
presence of liability insurance. Although the existence of insurance
is rarely, if ever, mentioned in court, its presence is assumed by both
the judge and the jury. Accordingly, this assumption affects the willingness of the courts to allow liability to be shifted to an innocent
party.
Increases in the number of tort actions historically were not in
claims against individuals; rather the increases occurred in claims
against incorporated enterprises. The practice of issuing liability insurance began with the indemnifying of employers who were being held
vicariously liable for their employees' torts. Insurance was demanded,
at first, by small enterprises who could not afford the loss incurred by
successful claims against them. 16
Once courts acknowledged that losses could be shifted so that the

"Id. at 551.
THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 471 (3d ed. 1964) [Hereinafter
cited as PROSSER,TORTS].
14See Williams, Vicarious Liability: Tort of the Master or of the Servant? 72 L. Q.
REV. 522 (1956).
"PRossER, TORTS § 69, at 572 (3d ed. 1964).
"Gardner, Insurance Against Tort Liability: An Approach to the Cosmology of the
"3PROssEE, HANDBOOK o

Law, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 454 (1950).
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burden rested on society generally, the capacity to bear the loss 17 became a factor in determining the existence of a duty on the part of the
defendant.' 8 To summarize, the purpose of vicarious liability is to assure
compensation to the injured plaintiffs while placing the burden of loss
on the parties best able to shift the costs forward onto the greatest
number of persons.
Society benefits from the distribution of loss in two ways: (1) from
the sum of the good accruing to those who are compensated in cases
which would not have been compensated without vicarious liability;
and (2) indirectly, from preventing the repercussions of individual
financial ruin. 19 Because society approves of this general distribution
of loss, it assumes the ultimate responsibility for compensating injuries
arising from growing social interdependence and measures the merits
of applying joint adventure or joint enterprise doctrines to vicarious
liability by the breadth of loss distribution.20
JOINT ADVENTURE OR JOINT ENTERPRISE-THE EFFECTS
OF IMPUTING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PRINCIPLE
OF DISTRIBUTING THE LOSS.
The doctrine of vicarious liability with respect to joint adventure
and joint enterprise rests on an analogy to the law of partnerships. 21 A
joint adventure is distinguished from a partnership only in that the
joint adventure is narrower in scope and purpose and is usually formed
to carry out a single undertaking, although this undertaking may ex22
tend over a considerable period of time or require multiple transactions.
One problem of joint adventure is that it is not easily identified; it is a
conclusion of law and need not be expressly named in a complaint or
an agreement. "The bar is aware of it mainly as a device to impose
legal liability as an additional cause of action in a complaint. The
bench has used the relationship to impose certain legal consequences
of the relationship as a measure of justice."23
"Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of Tort
Cases, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 807 (1930) [Hereinafter cited at Feezer, Capacity to
Bear Loss].
18PouNm, THE SPRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 189 (1921):
"There is a strong and
growing tendency, where there is no blame on either side, to ask in view of the
exigencies of social justice, who can bear the loss."
1
James, Liability Reconsidered 550.
mFeezer, Capacity to Bear Loss 810.
nPROSSER, TORTS § 71, at 488 (3d ed. 1964).
230
Am. Jur. § (
); (approved in) Rae v. Cameron, 112 Mont. 159, 167, 114
P.2d 1060, 1065 (1941). In Haminan v. U.S., 276 F. Supp. 420, 424 (1967) the
Federal District Court, Montana District, Billings Division, applied the UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT [Hereinafter cited as U.P.A.] as adopted in Title 63, REVISED
CODES OF MONTANA 1947 [Hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947] to a joint adventure
in determing under Section 63-207 whether the members of a joint adventure were
jointly liable for claims arising under the Workman's Compensation Act. See In re
Mc Anelly's Estate, 127 Mont. 158, 258 P.2d 741 (1953); Bradburry v. Negelhus,
132 Mont. 417, 319 P.2d 503 (1957).
'Taubman, What Constitutes a Joint Adventure, 41 Corn. L. Q. 640, 641 (1956).
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The members of a joint adventure are, as are members in a partnership, jointly and severally liable for the conduct of any member.2 4 Likewise, the contributory negligence of one of its members is imputed to
the others. 25 A joint 26adventure is based on the same principles of
agency as partnership.
A joint enterprise may be considered as broadening the theory of
joint adventure because it does not require a profit-or-loss venture. To
this extent, the doctrine of joint enterprise rests, as best, on an attenuated
analogy to a partnership. 27 Unlike the joint adventure, the application
28
It
of a joint enterprise has been mostly in the field of automobile law.
is more a defendant's tool to impute contributory negligence of the
driver to the passenger, rather than a method29of joining several innocent
parties as co-defendants with the tort-feasor.
An example of the positive effect of the application of the joint
enterprise is the California case of Shook v. Beals. 30 The Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of joint enterprise to a group of five men
who shared the expenses of chartering an air plane to fly to a fishing
area.31 Of the five men only one was a pilot, but on the facts the
court found that the other men had a common right of control. 32 Due to
the negligence of the pilot, the plane flipped during the landing. The
lessor of the plane sued all of the men jointly as co-defendants on the
theory that the men were involved in a joint enterprise.
In determining if there was sufficient evidence to conclude the
existence of a joint enterprise, the court declared that the elements
constituting a joint enterprise were: a common destination; a power
to determine or change the route from time to time by mutual agreement; and the fact that the trip was for a common but non-business
[Court's italics] purpose. Although no other cases in California involved plane charters, the court saw no distinction 3 8between this case
and cases applying the same doctrine to automobiles.
-R.C.M. 1947 § 63-207.
OF TORTS § 491(1) (1965).
"Id. Comment b at 548 (1965).
"Although some writers have said that the doctrine is grounded strictly on the
principles of Responeat Superior, in the case of Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C.B. 115
(1849) an omnibus passenger was denied recovery from a third person on a presumption of agency between the passenger and the driver-the driver's contributory
negligence was imputed to the passenger. Weintraub, The Joint Enterprise Doctrine
in Automobile Law, 16 CORN. L. Q. 320 (1931) [Hereinafter cited as Weintraub,
Joint EnterpriseDoctrine].
"'James, Vicarious Liability, 28 TULANE L. REv. 161, 210 (1954) [Hereinafter cited as
James,Vicarious Liability].
"PRossER, TORTS § 71 at 489 (3d ed. 1964).
1096 Cal. App.2d 963, 217 P.2d 56, 18 A.L.R.2d 919 (1950).
196 Cal. App.2d at .........
217 P.2d at 61, 18 A.L.R.2d at 926.
"The evidence showed that the men had, in fact, exerted control over the plane by
(1) mutually deciding to make an intermediate stop; and (2) by mutually agreeing
to land at an air field despite warnings that the air strip was too short for the
plane which they had chartered.
"96 Cal. App.2d at ........
, 217 P.2d at 61, 18 A.L.R.2d at 925.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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This case differs from other joint enterprise cases not in that it
extended the use of joint enterprise to fields other than automobile
law, but because it is one instance where the doctrine is employed by
the plaintiff to join several innocent persons as co-defendants. 34 Notwithstanding the absense of a mutual business, the California court
found sufficient agency among the members to hold all enterprisers
jointly liable for the pilot's negligence.3 5 In the Beals case, the result
of utilizing the joint enterprise doctrine was that the loss was distributed
among the enterprisers. In this way, the joining of the members of the
enterprise as co-defendants better assured the plaintiff full compensation but also limited the possibility of financial harm to any one of the
defendants.
The alternative reasons for developing the joint enterprise doctrine
were a defensive means of replacing discarded theories which had once
been employed by defendants to bar the claims of passengers riding
with contributorily negligent drivers.3 6 In Montana, at one time, contributory negligence of the driver was automatically imputed to any
38
passenger riding with him, 37 but the doctrine was since overruled.
The marital relationship between the driver and passenger spouse is
is another discarded defense to the passenger's claim against the defendant. 39 Because contributory negligence is a complete defense, once
the defendant established a joint enterprise, imputed contributory negli40
gence bars the passenger's claim against him.
In Sumner v. Amacher 4' the Montana court rejected the joint enterprise doctrine completely.4 2 Prior to that case, the court had in all
joint adventures, 43 except in automobile cases, 44 required a common

business venture. The decision in Amacher is consistent with the trend
of thought which believes that the doctrine of joint enterprise should
be discarded.

45

Because Montana does not recognize the concept of comparative
"'PROSSER,

TORTS

§ 71,

at 489 (3d ed. 1964).

1196
Cal. App.2d at ........ , 217 P.2d at 61, 18 A.L.R.2d at 926.
30
PROSSER, TORTS

§ 71;

Weintraub, Joint Enterprise Doctrine, 320 (1930).

'Whittaker v. City of Helena, 12 Mont. 124, 35 P.904 (1894).
mLaird v. Berthelote, 63 Mont. 122, ........-, 206 P.445, 448 (1922); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 490 (1964). For a passenger to be barred from stating a
claim against a third party he must be contributorily negligent himself. The
passenger in a vehicle is required to exercise reasonable care for his own safety.
Wolf v. Barry O'Leary Inc.. ........ Mont. 318 P.2d 582 (1957).
-R.C.M. 1947 §§ 36-109, 93-2803. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 487, at
543 and Comment b, at 544 (1965).
-Id. § 491(1), at 547 (1965).

........ Mont- ......... 437 P.2d 630 (1968).
2437 P.2d at 636.
"Rae v. Cameron, supra, note 22.

"Hurley v. Tymofichuk, 139 Mont. 50, 359 P.2d 378 (
); Laird v. Bertelote,
supra, note 38.
"James, Vicarious Liability 215; PROSSER, TORTS § 71, at 494 (3d ed. 1964);
Weintraub, Joint Enterprise Doctrine 338.
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negligence, 46 the imputation of contributory negligence to a member
of a joint enterprise is a complete bar to his right of recovery against
a third party. According to the Restatement position, the innocent
enterpriser has a right of recovery from the negligent enterpriser.4 7 However, under the Montana Automobile Guest Statutes 48 an automobile
passenger is prohibited a right of recovery from the driver in most
circumstances. Accordingly, the effect of the joint enterprise doctrine
is not only to deny the passenger recovery from the driver of the other
car, but also from the driver of the passenger's vehicle. The innocent
passenger, as a joint enterpriser, receives no compensation from either
of two negligent parties. In terms of the principles of vicarious liability,
the application of this doctrine denies recovery where there should be
a right of compensation and places the total burden of loss on the innocent
plaintiff. For these reasons Montana properly rejected the doctrine of
joint enterprise.
The second question was whether the joint enterprise doctrine
should be retained where it operates to impute negligence to members
of an enterprise jointly as co-defendants. On the basis of the analogy
to a partnership, the laws of partnership should have some influence.4 9
Imputing negligence of one member of the joint enterprise to the other
enterprisers may have several results: (1) The members may be held
jointly liable, thereby spreading the loss and risk of financial harm
to all of them; (2) The enterpriser carrying insurance may be reached;
(3) A member more financially responsible may be held severally liable
for the plaintiff's loss.
To some extent the imputing of negligence of one enterpriser to all
the enterprisers achieves one desired result of the vicarious liability
doctrine. Where the tort-feasor as sole defendant is proof against judgment, the plaintiff may, by joining the other enterprisers, obtain full
compensation. However, the joint enterprise is not a financial endeavor
and there is no common fund or joint investment which may absorb
the loss. The loss distribution will fall upon the individual members,
but will not be distributed to a greater number of persons. Although
the risk of financial harm is reduced, the doctrine does not spread the
loss to society generally. The doctrine effects harsh results on a few,
but because it compensates the innocent party it should be retained.
The third fundamental question is whether the joint adventure doctrine,
by imputing contributory negligence, promotes the distribution principles of vicarious liability. The answer is equivocal depending upon
the right of the injured adventurer to receive compensation from the
"Sztaba v. Great Northern Ry.. ........ Mont .........
47

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

or

TORTS

§

411 P.2d 379(

).

491, Comment b (1965).

-R.C.M. 1947 §§ 32-1113 to 32-1116. Under the Montana Guest Statutes, the
passenger of the vehicle does not have a right of recovery against the driver unless
he has been grossly negligent.
4
Hamman v. U.S., supra note 22, at 424.
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common fund of the adventure. The rule as adopted in Sumner v. Amacher requiring a community of pecuniary interest pertains only if the
venture is for the mutual sharing of the profits and losses. 0
Title 63 of the R.C.M. 1947, Section 301 reads: "The rights and
duties of the partners in relationship to the partnership shall be determined, by the following rules . . . (b) The partnership must indemnify

every partner in respect of payments made and personal liabilities
reasonably incurred by him in the ordinary and proper conduct of its
business." The adventurer, as a member of the joint adventure has a
right to indemnity, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
if it is determined that his injuries are included within the definition
of part (b) "personal liabilities.

'5 2

In making this determination, it should be considered that the member would not be barred by imputed contributory negligence but for
his membership in the joint adventure and that the injuries were reasonably incurred by him in the ordinary and proper conduct of its business.

53

The concept of vicarious liability suggests that if the doctrine of
joint adventure applies it both compensates the injured parties and
distributes the loss over the greatest number of people. If contributory
negligence is imputed, the member barred recovery from third parties
should be compensated from the common funds of the venture. To
effect the desired results of the doctrine of vicarious liability, the adventure's loss should be treated as a cost of doing business and that
loss shifted to the income of the venture. Under these circumstances
the loss will be distributed and the injured member compensated.
However, if the loss or liability of the injured member of the
joint adventure cannot be recovered from the venture itself, the doctrine of joint adventure has the same pejorative effects as the doctrine
of joint enterprise. In cases where the adventurer is not compensated
by the joint adventure and is denied recovery from third parties. because of the membership in the joint adventure, the doctrine works
adversely to the social insurance principles of vicarious liability and
should be discarded.
REX B. STRATTON, III

50437 P.2d at 635-636.
51

U.P.A. § 18.
cf. Smith v. Hensley, 354 S.W.2d 744, 98 A.L.R.2d 340 (Ky. 1962).
-R.C.M. 1947 § 63-301.
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